UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 2 3 *ERIC FORSYTHE, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, * Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION 5 * Nos. 04-10584-GAO 04-10764 *SUN LIFE FINANCIAL, INCORPORATED, et al.* 04-11019 Defendant 04-11458 8 . BEFORE THE HONORABLE GEORGE A. O'TOOLE, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 MOTIONS HEARING October 20, 2004 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Courtroom No. 9 1 Courthouse Way 21 · Boston, Massachusetts 02109 · JAMES P. GIBBONS, RPR/RMR 23 Official Court Reporter 1 Courthouse Way, Suite 7205 24 Boston, Massachusetts 02210 (617) 428-0402. 25

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PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: Court is in session. Please be seated.

Forsythe versus Sun Financial, Civil Action No. 04-10584, and related matters: Civil Action No. 04-10764, 04-11019, and 04-11458.

THE COURT: Well, we have a series of motions, as I think you all know, about whether to consolidate and whether and whom to appoint as lead counsel.

I think maybe the way to deal with it is to hear from the Forsythe plaintiffs in support of consolidation and approval of new counsel. Then I will hear the opposition from the Dumond action, and then any defendants who want to add their perspective.

I have read the papers. So I have some idea, although, to be perfectly candid, I am not sure I understood all the arguments as well as I would like to from the papers. But, anyway, why don't we start with the Forsythe plaintiffs.

MS. FOLLACK: Good afternoon, your Honor. Me name is Janine Pollack, and I'm from the law firm of Milberg, Weiss in New York City; and we represent the Forsythe plaintiff group, which consists of the Forsythe plaintiffs, the Eddings plaintiffs and the Koslow plaintiffs. We also seek to add an additional plaintiff,

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MS. POLLACK: The provision that is cited by the Dumond plaintiffs, which is on the prior page from Tab 6, which is Section D, is nothing more than an allocation provision which basically says if you have assets in a Fund One, you cannot offset Fund Two's liability with Fund One's assets. It's really strictly an allocation provision, and it says that the trustees have discretion to allocate. So it does not support the argument of the Dumond plaintiffs that we are still suing the funds. I think they've just misread the provision.

I will not take the Court through the second form N-1-A except to say that it's essentially the same exact thing as the other one in the sense that it makes it clear that in this particular instance there's a trust and there are series or funds within that trust, but it is really no different than the other ones. Really it's all the same thing. We're suing the trusts not the funds.

And I think if the Court wishes to have me go through the tabs, it's really the same exact situation and has the same language in that Paragraph 6.9 as the first one that I showed the Court.

In terms of the standing issue, since the conflict issue really doesn't exist, the standing issue is something that really does not need to be addressed at this point. It really does not have anything to do with consolidation.

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As I said before, there is individual standing here for at least some of the funds, that is clear. No one is objecting to that. Nobody is arguing with that.

How many of the funds can actually be involved in the derivative action; in other words, on how many funds' behalf can it be brought, is a question for another day.

Essentially, amended complaint will be filed, and it will be up to the defense to raise that issue in either a motion to dismiss or class cert. proceeding. And I think the defense, when they get up and speak, they will agee with that, since they have put that in their papers as well.

So the standing issue, while it's certainly an interesting issue, it really does not affect what your Honor has to do here today.

Nonetheless, if it were an issue, which we don't believe it is, we believe the juridical link doctrine allows us to bring claims on -- derivative claims on behalf of all of the 112 funds; and, in that sense, the Forsythe plaintiffs seek to maximize the recovery against the maximum number of wrongdoers for the maximum number of shareholders past and present. And that makes much more sense than having piecemeal litigation and carve outs for people, such as Dumond plaintiffs, who only seek to represent a handful of the funds.

For example, the Dumond plaintiffs don't really say

what would happen to the other 100-or-so funds on whose behalf they claim they cannot bring a derivative suit. They seem to just leave them hanging.

In addition, the Forsythe plaintiffs have brought claims under the Investment Advisors Act, Section 215, and they, the Dumond plaintiffs, don't explain what would happen to those claims either if they were the only ones allowed to bring derivative claims.

So, essentially, the standing issue -- it doesn't need to be resolved today. It's really something that is for another day and has nothing to do with consolidation and does not support the consolidation opposition.

Their final argument is that there are different claims in the Forsythe action versus the Dumond action, and that also is not true.

Both cases essentially allege excessive fees, and that has different ways to be alleged.

Essentially, the claim is that the excessive fees are being taken from the shareholders and the funds and essentially finding their way as profits to the investment adviser. The investment adviser and its affiliates, or — the investment adviser is the primary defendant in both set of plaintiffs' cases. Section 36(b) is alleged in both cases, and, essentially, it's the same concept.

Now, the Dumond plaintiffs say that they don't

allege directed brokerage payments, but that's not true either, because in Paragraph 45 of their complaint it says very clearly that they're alleging that there was directed brokerage payment going on.

So, in effect, they're the same cases, and that's why consolidation is so appropriate here, and there should not be a carve out for just 11 funds for the Dumond plaintiffs to pursue on their own. It would be inefficient and, as the defendants have pointed out, it would cause multiple sets of briefings, multiple complaints, and it would really be a proliferation of paper for absolutely no reason when they're all the same claims, in effect.

There is -- in other words, there is a lot of arguments why it would be the most efficient to consolidate the cases, and there is not a single argument against consolidation.

There is a final point that I'd like to address, which is the suggestion that there was some sort of conspiracy theory, some sort of conspiracy by the market-timing counsel and the counsel in these excessive fees cases to remove the defendants -- remove the funds as defendants in order to resolve the conflict pointed out by the Dumond plaintiffs. That just is not the case.

The defendant -- the funds were removed as defendants in the timing cases because legally and

So I would submit that their proposal that these cases be consolidated and there be just one lawyer that they have to deal with, really is impractical and doesn't -- isn't really necessary. These cases can be coordinated to the extent necessary so that there isn't any duplicative discovery, but there is no reason to consolidate these cases and to require one complaint be filed in these cases. We can work together to try to work as best we can to coordinate discovery issues, and if there are any issues at a later date on those issues, we certainly could come back to the Court to address those questions.

But ultimately the question is whether the lawyers for the Forsythe plaintiffs can represent these 36(b) claims, and I submit that they cannot; and, in that context, there is going to have to be separate lawyers to represent those claims. We're the only unconflicted lawyers who are before this Court, and we're ready, willing and able to pursue those claims as zealously as we can.

Thank you.

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MR. PAINE: Bill Paine, your Honor.

I just -- I don't want to address the conflict issue. Although, I guess I would follow with the notion that the reason I don't want to is there is something in it for me if someone with a conflict is my opponent. I just don't think it makes a difference from the point of view of

consolidation.

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The first issue I would like to talk about is whether or not these are the same case or a different case.

Both of them are bringing 36(b) claims. They're each bringing them on behalf of four exactly the same funds, and then each of them have some additional funds on whose behalf they want to bring claims as well.

So you've got a core 36(b) claim that's the same, and it's the same for both sets of plaintiffs.

With respect to the additional plaintiffs that they want to represent, it's basically the same. I mean, you know, it's going to be the same theory. It's going to be the same discovery. It's just a question of how many of the various funds they're allowed to bring it on behalf.

So at its core you're hearing from the Dumond people that this is a 36(b) claim as its core, and at that core is exactly the same claim, and that's why we think that this thing --

THE COURT: You mean factually?

MR. PAINE: Factually, legally, it's the same.

It's the same party, same theory, same relief.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know if there's agreement that it is the same factual basis. Although, I am not sure how significant that is.

MR. PAINE: Well, one complaint, I guess, or